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COMMENT

ARTIS V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—
WHAT DID THE COURT ACTUALLY SAY?
Doron M. Kalir*
INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court issued Artis v. District of Columbia.1
A true “clash of the titans,” this 5–4 decision featured colorful comments on both
sides, claims of “absurdities,” uncited use of Alice in Wonderland vocabulary
(“curiouser,” anyone?), and an especially harsh accusation by the dissent that “we’ve
wandered so far from the idea of a federal government of limited and enumerated
powers that we’ve begun to lose sight of what it looked like in the first place.” 2
One might assume that the issue in question was a complex constitutional
provision, or a dense, technical federal code section. Far from it. The sole issue in
Artis was the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), an obscure tolling provision
dealing with the time period allowed for plaintiffs who filed their claims in federal
court and were dismissed to refile their claims in state court.3 The majority—
authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—provided a generous interpretation, allowing
plaintiffs some more time to refile. 4 The dissent—authored by Justice Gorsuch and
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—thought that, in most cases,
plaintiffs should receive no more than thirty days to refile. 5
This Comment does not follow the many constitutional and jurisprudential
intricacies of this fascinating battle. Instead, it intends to point to what seems to be

© 2018 Doron M. Kalir. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute
copies of this Comment in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each
copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes
this provision and copyright notice.
* Clinical Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to thank my
students in Federal Courts class, especially Ms. Erika Molnar, for their probing questions. I would
also like to thank Professors Michael Dorf and James Pfander, as well as participants in the North
Eastern Ohio (NEO) Faculty Workshop, for their carefully worded comments.
1 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018).
2 Id. at 617 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 611–12 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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a glaring misunderstanding of the majority opinion by the dissent. This Comment
also raises the possibility that the majority itself did not understand the full
implications of its own opinion, as evidenced by its response to the dissent. If this
is indeed the state of affairs, an inevitable question arises: What did the Court
actually say in Artis v. District of Columbia?
I.

SUBSECTION 1367(D): TWO INTERPRETIVE OPTIONS

In civil cases, section 1367 grants federal courts power over state claims “that
are so related to” the federal claims at issue “that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 6 Such power is
known as “supplemental jurisdiction.”7 Thus, the federal district court may entertain
a complaint containing both federal- and state-law claims, as was the case in Artis.8
At times, however, the federal court will dismiss the federal claim. At that
point, the rationale for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state claims
disappears.9 But those claims are usually dismissed without prejudice, allowing the
plaintiff an opportunity to refile them in state court. The question presented by
subsection 1367(d), therefore, is how much time plaintiffs have to refile.10 The
answer could be, conceivably, thirty days, or another reasonable period of time. But
the text of subsection 1367(d) is concerned with another issue altogether: the lapse
of the statute of limitations for the state-law claims included in the complaint, while
the case is pending in federal court. The answer thus offered by this subsection is
as follows:
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any
other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or
after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law
11
provides for a longer tolling period.

Or, as Justice Ginsburg put it in her majority opinion: “The period of
limitations for any [state] claim [joined with a claim within federal-court
competence] shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a
period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling
period.”12
The subsection’s inelegant prose offers two possible interpretations. The first
reading suggests that while the claim is pending in federal court, the state-granted
period of limitations continues to run, and likely will lapse while the federal
litigation is pending.13 The plaintiff, however, would still have some time to refile

6 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
7 Id.
8 Petitioner filed a complaint alleging a federal gender discrimination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, as well as several state law claims. See Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 599.
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
10 Id. § 1367(d).
11 Id.
12 Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 598 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)).
13 Though not explicitly, both the majority and the dissent assumed that while the case is
pending in federal court, the state statute of limitations would likely lapse. See Artis, 138 S. Ct. at
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her claim in state court after dismissal, because the federal statute grants her a
refiling period of thirty days (“grace period”). In addition, state law may grant her
a separate grace period to refile. Whichever is longer—the thirty-day federal grace
period or the state-law (optional) grace period—is the time period during which a
plaintiff may refile her claim in state court. 14 This is the narrower reading of the
subsection (the “grace-period reading”).15
According to the second reading, once a claim is filed in federal court, the stategranted limitation period for refiling is suspended (“tolled”). 16 Only after the claim
is dismissed does the limitation clock begin to run again; thus, the plaintiff may refile
her case in state court during a much longer period. To begin with, she may use the
remaining time until the state limitations period lapses; to that she may add the
subsection’s federally mandated thirty days. Alternatively, recall that state law may
accord a separate time period to refile the claim in state court (dubbed “grace period”
earlier). Thus, the plaintiff may use one of two time periods to refile her claim:
either the federally based time period (consisting of the state-tolled remaining period
plus the federally mandated thirty days), or the state-based grace period as provided
by state law. Whichever period is longer is the time allowed to refile. This is the
more generous reading of the subsection (the “stop-the-clock reading”).17
Artis itself provides a nice illustration of the difference between the two
readings. Plaintiff filed her claim in federal court with “nearly two years remain[ing]
on the applicable [state] statute of limitations.”18 The case remained in federal court
for two-and-a-half years, essentially running out the clock on the state statute of
limitations.19 The state claims were then dismissed without prejudice.20 Plaintiff
refiled her claims in state court fifty-nine days later.21 If the grace period reading
were to control, then since Plaintiff had essentially only thirty days to file (assuming
state law did not provide a longer refiling grace period)22, her claims were timebarred. But if the stop-the-clock reading were to control, then Plaintiff had plenty
of time to file—the period that remained on the state statute of limitations (nearly

616 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[F]ederal litigation is no quick business . . . .”). This is a crucial
assumption for our purposes.
14 See id. at 598 (majority opinion) (stating that “plaintiff is accorded a grace period of 30
days to refile in state court post dismissal of the federal case”); id. at 608 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he law ensures the party will enjoy whatever time state law allows, or at least 30 days, to refile
the claim in state court.”).
15 Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 600. As the dissent points out, that period was actually twenty-three months. Id. at
613 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 600 (majority opinion).
20 See id. at 599.
21 Id. at 600.
22 The Court—neither in the majority opinion nor in its dissent—provided any information
on the relevant state grace period law. The same is true for both lower courts’ decisions, the parties’
briefs, and the two amici. Since it is hard to prove a negative, I will assume, for purposes of this
Comment, that pertinent state law did not provide a grace period longer than thirty days.
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two years), plus the statutory thirty days. 23 Assuming that latter timeframe, the fiftynine-day filing period was well within her rights.
The majority in Artis adopted the stop-the-clock reading, allowing the filing to
proceed.24 The dissent, vehemently objecting, adopted the grace-period reading,
barring the claim from being refiled. 25
The two readings differ in two pertinent ways, both crucial for the
misunderstanding later perpetuated by the dissent. First, under the grace period
approach, the refiling period will mostly be a choice between two fixed periods—
the federal statutory thirty-day period, and the state’s statutory refiling grace period,
whichever is longer. In contrast, under the stop-the-clock reading, the choice would
always be between one fixed period—the state’s statutory grace period for refiling—
and one variable—the period of time between the filing date in federal court and the
expiration of the state limitations period, plus the federally mandated thirty days.
Second, and more importantly, one should consider the time period during
which the case is pending in federal court (“federal pendency”). According to the
grace-period reading, federal pendency is taken into consideration each time the
subsection is invoked to examine whether the state limitations period—which, as
noted earlier, is not suspended during the proceeding—has run while the case was
pending in federal court. If so—that is, if the state limitations period has run (which
the Justices assumed will happen in most cases)26—then the choice will be between
the federally mandated grace period (thirty days) and the state statutory grace period,
if one exists.27 But in the rare instance where the state limitations period has not run
during federal pendency, that state limitations period will be added to the thirty-day
mandatory period granted by the federal statute.
In contrast to the grace-period reading, federal pendency is not considered at
all under the stop-the-clock reading. Once the claim has been filed in federal court,
the only time period that matters is the one remaining on the state limitations period.
That time is now frozen, regardless of the period the case will spend in federal court.
Federal pendency, in other words, is immaterial to the stop-the-clock approach. This
seems fair, since we would not like to distinguish between plaintiffs based solely on
the time their claim was pending—but not adjudged—in federal court. Some federal
judges take their time, while others are more efficient. But the rate at which the
federal judge dispenses with the case should not affect the time allowed by statute
for refiling it in state court. And the case at hand provides a nice illustration: had
the federal pendency period (two-and-a-half years) been considered, then Plaintiff
would not have had fifty-nine days to refile in state court.
Let us consider a simple model to illustrate these points.

23 Surprisingly, neither the majority nor the dissent found time to calculate how much time,
precisely, was left for Plaintiff to file.
24 See Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 598 at 608.
25 See id. at 610 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
26 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2012).
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SUBSECTION 1367(D): THE MODEL

Subsection 1367(d) introduces several terms. For convenience, we can build
a simple model describing the relations between them. Going back to Justice
Ginsburg’s iteration of the subsection: “The period of limitations for any [state]
claim [joined with a claim within federal-court competence] shall be tolled while the
claim is pending [in federal court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed
unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”28
Let the period between the filing date in federal court and the last day of the
state’s limitations period be marked ∆1. (For example, if the claim was filed in
federal court two years prior to the run of the state’s statute of limitations, then ∆1
= 2 years.) Let the federal pendency period—the time in which “the claim is
pending [in federal court]” 29—be marked as ∆2. Let the federally mandated thirtyday grace period be marked as 30 days. And let the State’s grace period for refiling
be marked as STg.30
According to the stop-the-clock reading of the statute, the time period allowed
for refiling the case in state court will be determined as follows:
If STg > (∆1 + 30 days), then STg;
If STg < (∆1 + 30 days), then ∆1 + 30 days.
Note that the federal pendency period—∆2—is not a part of the equation under
any circumstances according to the stop-the-clock reading. This is an important
point. Federal pendency is considered under the grac- period reading, but since that
view was rejected by the majority, there is no need to present it here in model form.
I turn now to examine the several examples provided in the case, which
illuminate the misunderstanding perpetuated by the dissent.
III.

SUBSECTION 1367(D): FOUR EXAMPLES

A. Example 1: The Actual Facts of the Case
“When Artis first asserted her state-law claims in the District Court, nearly two
years remained on the applicable [state] three-year statute of limitations.”31 (As
noted earlier, the actual time remaining on the state limitations period was twenty28 Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 598 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d)).
29 Id.
30 The Court points to at least two states where the grace period (STg) is quite substantial:
“Indiana[, which] permits a plaintiff to refile within three years of dismissal. And Louisiana[,
which] provides that after dismissal the limitations period ‘runs anew.’” Id. at 606 (citations
omitted) (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3466 (West 2018)). Though the language of both
pertinent state-law sections is quite vague, courts have interpreted each statute to allow plaintiffs
to refile in accordance with the state-based grace period. See, e.g., Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d
920, 923–24 (7th Cir. 1989) (interpreting a former version of Indiana’s “savings statute” as
allowing five years to refile); Pankratz v. Noble Drilling Corp., 501 So. 2d 797, 799 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (Louisiana allows the refiling period to run again).
31 Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 600.
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three months.)32 “But two and a half years passed before the federal court
relinquished jurisdiction.”33 “Fifty-nine days after the dismissal of her federal
action, Artis refiled her state-law claims in the D.C. Superior Court, the appropriate
local court.”34 Was her filing timely? Let us examine the model:
∆1 = 23 months.
∆2 = 2.5 years.
STg = unknown; assumed to be 30 days.35
Since ∆1 + 30 days > STg (23 months + 30 days > 30 days), the period allowed for
refiling is approximately two years. 36 Since Plaintiff refiled her claim within fiftynine days, she was well within her rights, and her state claims may continue.
B. Example 2: Dissent Hypothetical # 1
The dissent offered several hypotheticals to support its view. Here is one:
[T]ake a plaintiff who files suit in federal court shortly after a six year state law
limitations period begins running and the litigation lasts six years before it’s
finally dismissed. Under the Court’s approach, federal law will now promise the
plaintiff nearly six years more (plus those stray 30 days again) to refile his claim
37
in state court.

Is that correct? Let us review the model:
∆1 = 6 years.
∆2 = 6 years.
STg = unknown; likely 30 days.
Since ∆1 + 30 days > STg, then the longer period is the one prescribed by
federal law, and the dissent is correct. The plaintiff will have nearly six years, plus
thirty days, to refile in state court. Notice, again, that although ∆2 is mentioned by
the dissent, it has no bearing on the result and is not included in the equation.
C. Example 3: Dissent Hypothetical # 2
Here is another hypothetical offered by the dissent:

32 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
33 Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 600.
34 Id.
35 The Court, again, provided no information regarding the length of the “longer tolling
period,” if any, provided by the District of Columbia. Id. at 598 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
(2012)); see supra note 22 and accompanying text. According to the dissent, “the great bulk of
States provide for grace periods of 30 days or longer; only a few States don’t allow that much or
don’t speak to the question.” Id. at 616 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
36 Unfortunately, this fundamental—and necessary—finding of fact is missing from the
opinion of either the majority or the dissent.
37 Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 617 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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Say state law provides a 5 year statute of limitations and a 1 year grace period for
refiling. The plaintiff files in federal court one day before the statute of
limitations expires. The litigation in federal court lasts 1 year. Under the Court’s
view, the federal “tolling period” would be 1 year plus 30 days—the time the
claim was pending in federal court plus 30 days after dismissal. That period is
longer than the state tolling period of 1 year and so the federal tolling rule, not
the state rule, controls—leaving the plaintiff only 31 days to refile her claim after
38
dismissal even though state law would have allowed a full year.

Is the dissent correct? Let us review:
∆1 = 1 day.
∆2 = 1 year.
STg = 1 year.
Since ∆1 + thirty days < STg (as thirty-one days is less than one year), then
the longer (state grace) period is the one allowed by federal law. Accordingly, per
the generous state grace period, the plaintiff will have one full year to file. Again,
that result is achieved regardless of the federal pendency period (∆2), and without
including it in the equation. The dissent, however—thinking the plaintiff will have
only thirty-one days to refile—is in error. And the reason for that error is simple:
Justice Gorsuch includes the federal pendency period—∆2—in his computation of
the time allowed for refiling. But as we have seen, federal pendency has nothing to
do with the stop-the-clock reading. Not stopping here, Justice Gorsuch continues to
fault the majority for his own confused logic, which brings us to the fourth and last
example in this case.
D. Example 4: Dissent Hypothetical #3
That may be curious enough, but curiouser it gets. Now suppose the litigation in
federal court lasts only 10 months. That makes the federal tolling period only 11
months (10 months plus 30 days). Under the Court’s view, state law now
provides a longer tolling period (1 year) and the litigant gets a full year to refile
39
in state court instead of 31 days.

Is the dissent correct? Clearly, the only difference between the two
hypotheticals is in the federal pendency period—∆2. In this example it equals ten
months, while in the previous example it equaled one year. That, again, is of no
moment, as the federal pendency period is not relevant to the computation under the
stop-the-clock reading. While the dissent happens to be correct regarding the result
in this example—the plaintiff has one year, as in the previous example, to refile in
state court—its analysis demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the
majority’s opinion (and of the way the refiling period should be calculated).
But Justice Gorsuch had more: “No one has offered a reason why the
happenstance of how long the federal litigation lasted should determine how much
time a litigant has to refile in state court. Yet that is what the Court’s reading of

38
39

Id. at 612.
Id.
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section 1376(d) demands.”40 But as we have explained, that is not what the majority
requires. Quite the opposite: the federal pendency period, ∆2, is never part of the
refiling-calculation equation. The dissent, in other words, misunderstands the rule
announced by the majority.
IV.

SUBSECTION 1367(D): THE MAJORITY’S RESPONSE

According to Justice Gorsuch, the two (wrong) examples he conjured were
intended to show the “absurdities” that followed the Court’s stop-the-clock
approach.41 One would assume, therefore, that as soon as the majority viewed these
examples for the errors they represent they would be quick to point out the mistakes
and correct them. Thus, one would expect the majority to write a short paragraph
explaining why federal pendency is irrelevant to the equation, correcting both the
logic and the result of the dissent.
But that is not what happened. Responding to the dissent’s examples (in
customary fashion, by a footnote), the majority makes quite a confusing statement
of its own:
The dissent . . . conjures up absurdities not presented by this case, for the District
of Columbia has no law of the kind the dissent describes. All agree that the phrase
“unless State law provides for a longer tolling period” leaves room for a more
generous state-law regime. The dissent posits a comparison between the duration
of the federal suit, plus 30 days, and a state-law grace period. But of course, as
the dissent recognizes, . . . the more natural comparison is between the amount
of time a plaintiff has left to refile, given the benefit of § 1367(d)’s tolling rule,
and the amount of time she would have to refile under the applicable state law.
Should the extraordinary circumstances the dissent envisions in fact exist in a
42
given case, the comparison the dissent makes would be far from inevitable.

From the majority reply one can assume that “the extraordinary circumstances
the dissent envisions” may happen, but that would never be the case since the federal
pendency period (∆2) is never counted in the process of computing the time allowed
for refiling, no such “extraordinary circumstances” will ever occur.
Thus, the majority’s comment—responding to one misunderstanding with
another—may leave us scratching our head: Is it possible that not only the dissent,
but the majority itself fails to fully understand the implication of the rule it just
announced?
CONCLUSION
In Artis, the Court was asked to perform a simple task: provide guidance to
lower courts, legal counsel, and prospective plaintiffs as to the time period allowed
for a plaintiff to refile her claim in state court once her federal claims were dismissed.
The Court—bitterly divided 5–4—seems to have provided an answer, which it
dubbed the stop-the-clock approach. Under that approach, the period allowed for
refiling will be the greater of two periods: either the grace period provided by state
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
Id. at 606 n.12 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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law (STg), or the sum of the federally granted thirty-day grace period plus the time
period between the filing date in federal court and the last day of the state’s limitation
period (∆1 + 30). Importantly, that interpretive approach explicitly excludes any
consideration of the time the case was pending in federal court—the federal
pendency period (∆2). The dissent seems to have failed to understand that simple
logical implication. The majority, or so it seems, did not fully grasp the implications
of its rule either.
Supreme Court Justices—especially the newest of them—would be better
advised to use their time concentrating on the judicial task at hand. They should
refrain from using their considerable firepower to deepen the divides within their
sacred institution. Especially so when, as in this case, such divides were completely
unnecessary.

